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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INVALIDITY OF THE FRAZIER-LEMKE AMENDMENT TO
THE BANKRUPTCY Acr-The Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank extended a
credit of $9,000 to Radford, secured by a mortgage on a farm of the appraised
value of $18,000. During the thirty four years interim for total amortization,
the investment was to carry annual interest at six per centum. Radford
defaulted in the payment of taxes, interest, and principal installments. Fore-
closure proceedings were instituted by the bank with a request for the appoint-
ment of a receiver to collect rents and profits. Following an unsuccessful
attempt by Radford to effect a composition, a judgment of foreclosure was
entered. Radford then petitioned the federal district court alleging that he
failed to obtain a composition, that he was unable to pay his debts as they
matured, and, therefore, was entitled to an adjudication as bankrupt with
relief under section 75, sub-section s, of the Bankruptcy Act. Held, Sub-sec-
tion s of section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act is unconstitutional as in deprivation
of property rights without due process of law.1
The concept of economic value is predicated upon earning power. Potential
earning power is the source of credit in the fractional transactions that form
the internal credit structure and its counterpart, the internal indebtedness.
With an almost blind faith we have permitted an unregulated hypothecation
of future earning power. Conseqdently, when depression impaired the capac-
ity of the economic process, the prospectus for future earnings became impos-
sible of realization. Neither the unsecured creditor nor the secured creditor
is invulnerable when the initial premise of credit is undermined. A security
res is without value aside from its earning power. The depreciated earning
capacity of the security res today with reference to the potential capacity of
the res, as judged on the day when credit was extended, becomes a present
loss that must be distributed in some equitable manner. While economic and
social reformers are contemplating a redistribution of wealth, the courts are
dealing with the problem of an equitable distribution of loss.
At least three approaches have been employed by Congress -to distribute
loss and mitigate its extent. First, a devaluation of the gold content of the
dollar was intended to depreciate all intangible assets and indebtedness by
forty per centum without regard to an individual ability to pay.2 A second
method for the alleviation of credit tension has operated to shift the credit
strain from individual creditors to the government.3 The third approach
is that of bankruptcy, the ramifications of which are now being submitted to
judicial trial and error. Through the principle of discharge an orthodox
bankruptcy proceeding has extended a possible method for debtor rehabilita-
tion but it has not offered the creditor an opportunity to share in a revival
of the debtor's ability to pay, Furthermore, a judicial liquidation and distri-
bution of the.debtor's assets often deprived the debtor of the tools of industry
necessary to effect the rehabilitation to which the principle of discharge is
devoted. A modification of the bankruptcy concept whereby the debtor retains
1 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford' (1935), 295 U. S. 555.
248 Stat. 51, 48 Stat. 337, Norman v. Baltimore 0. R. Co. (1935), 294
U. S. 240; 10 Ind. L. J. 455, Nebolsine, The Gold Clause in Private Con-
tracts (1933), 42 Yale L. J. 1051.
3 The Farm Credit Administration has been an integral factor in this pro-
gram.
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the tools of industry and the creditor shares in a possible renascence of earning
power, during a limited period of time and under supervision of the judiciary,
promised a mitigation of loss and a rehabilitation of both debtor and creditor.
An analysis of the text of the original Frazier-Lemke Amendment will reveal
with exactitude its relation to these modified objectives. 4
The salient portions of section 75, sub-section s, are contained in paragraphs
3 and 7 With the consent of the mortgagee, the bankrupt mortgagor might
purchase the property at its present appraised value in compliance with the
provisions of paragraph 3 for deferred payments over a six years period. A
one per centum interest charge accompanied the arrangement. In effect, para-
graph 7 required the bankruptcy court to impose a Congressional scheme for
payment of the appraised value of the property in discharge of the mortgage
if the mortgagee failed to acquiesce in the private arrangement of paragraph
3. For five years the terms of the mortgage were to be put in abeyance while
the debtor retained possession in consideration of a reasonable rental charge
which was to result to the creditors as their interests appeared. If the appraised
value of the property was paid into court within five years, a discharge of
the mortgage was to be decreed. The act was qualified by the mandate that
it should operate retroactively, not prospectively.
Whether the original Frazier-Lemke amendment was destructive of the dual
form of government in that it exceeded the ambit of the bankruptcy power
of Congress went unresolved by the court. That the legislative imagination
has not annoyed the judicial conception of bankruptcy escaped only as muendo.5
Bankruptcy legislation has long since shattered the ramifications of that topic
as known to the authors of the Constitution. The states early offered an
amenity through release of the person of the insolvent debtor.6 With the
federal bankruptcy statute of 1841, the principle of discharge was established
and judicially confirmed in the case, In re Klein. 7 Bankruptcy at the debtor's
volition supplanted the original devotion of the law to the creditor.8 The
privilege of bankruptcy has been expanded to include persons associated with
widely divergent occupations.9 Composition, both in the brackets of the un-
secured 10 and the secured creditors, 1 1 is a comparatively recent enlargement.
4 11 U. S. C. A. 203, sub-section s.
5 "But, the scope of the bankruptcy power conferred upon Congress is not
necessarily limited to that which has been exercised. The discharge of
the debts has come to be an object of no less concern than the distribution of
his property."
6 Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819), 4 Wheat. 122---"To punish honest in-
solvency by imprisonment for life would be an excess of inhumanity
which will not readily be imputed to the illustrious patriots who framed our
constitution, nor to the people who adopted it the State may refuse
to inflict this punishment, or may withold this means, and leave the contract
in full force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract, and simply to release
the prisoner does not impair its obligations."
7 (1843) 1 How. 277.
8The Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19, provided only for involuntary
bankruptcy. All subsequent enactments have recognized the voluntary petition.
9 Hanover National Bank v. Moyses (1902), 186 U. S. 181, Continental
Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co.
(1935), 294 U. S. 648.
10 Composition was endorsed in the act of 1867 as amended by the act of
1874, 18 Stat. 178, 182; In re Reiman 20 Fed. Cas. 490, 496, 497.
11 Continental Illinois Nat. Bk. & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Ry. Co. (1935), 294 U. S. 648.
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These specific illustrations do not define bankruptcy; they merely reflect a
judicial temper that remains amenable to the imaginative processes. Sub-
stantiated by a fund of respected opinion, Mr. Justice Story has said, "Per-
haps as satisfactory a description of a bankruptcy law as can be framed is
that it is a law for the benefit and relief of creditor2 and their debtors, in
cases in which the latter are unable or unwilling to pay their debts." 12 If
this descriptive generalization is not a definition, therein resides its value.
Only that which is presently known can be reduced to definition. As a
concession to convenience definition is justified but definition can too readily
preclude a review of that to which the mind later becomes aware. Bank-
ruptcy is not yet a dogma. The secured creditor may well be within its
purview. Rehabilitation may become the most important parcel of the concept.
The exercise of every governmental power is subject to the protective
restraints of the due process clause.1 3  Consequently, the bankruptcy power
of the federal government must be exercised in conformity with the judicial
conception of that which is due process of law. The tonception of due process
is the variable which makes for judicial supremacy in the balance of the
freedom of the individual as an individual as against the freedom of society
in dealing with its component parts. As related to the present investigation,
it became incumbent upon the court to evaluate the social interest in the
maintenance of the property rights of the individual when in conflict with
the interest of society in the economic rehabilitation of an independent, land
owning class of farmers and in the reduction of indebtedness to a point
commensurate with the earning capacity of our people. In the event that
the last named interests prevail in this appraisal, the court then must ascer-
tain whether the legislation appointed to subserve these interests transcends
the ambit thereof in wanton and unnecessary demolition or the rights of
creditors. In brief, the allocation of loss must be apportioned between debtor
and creditor that the latter suffer a deprivation of property only to an extent
necessary to sustain the interests given preference in the hierarchy of values.
That society, both through the agencies of state and federal government,
is privileged to make a reasonable invasion of property rights for a proper
objective is supported by a fund of authorlty.14 The social interest in public
12 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (4th Ed., 1873), Ch. 16, p. 50;
33 Mich. L. R. 1210; 44 Yale L. J. 651, Local Loan Co. v. Hunt (1934),
29Z U. S. 234, Hanover Nat. Bk. v. Moyses (1902), 186 U. S. 181, In re Reiman
(-1874), 20 Fed. Cases. 490-"What is the subject of bankruptcies? It is not,
properly, anything less than the subject of the relations between an.insolvent
or non-paying or fraudulent debtor; and his creditors, extending to his and
their relief." Mr. Justice Sutherland, in Continental Ill. Nat. Bk. & Trust
Co. v. Chi.,. R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., affrms the prediction of Mr. Justice Story
in this observation, "From the beginning the tendency of legislation and of
judicial interpretation has been uniformly in the direction of progressive liberal-
ization in respect of the operation of the bankruptcy power."
13Louisville Joint Stock Land Bk. v. Radford (1935), 295 U. S. 555, Ham-
ilton v. Ky. Distilleries Co. (1919), 251 U. S. 146, Blodgett v. Holden (1927),
275 U. S. 142; United States v. Cress (1916), 243 U. S. 316.
4 Sproles v. Binford (1931), 286 U. S. 374, Home Bldg. and Loan Assn.
v. Blaisdell (1934), 290 U. S. 398, Manigault v. Springs (1905), 199 U. S.
473, Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter (1908), 209 U. S. 349; Block
v. Hirsh (1920), 256 U. S. 135, Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Goldsboro
-(1913), 232 U. S. 48--"Contract and property rights are held subject to a fair
exercise of the police power."
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health, 1 5 safety,16 morals,17 economic security and progress'8 social security,1 9
and a more or less vague general welfare 20 have individually and in union
supported legislative interference with property and contract. The recent
decisions, Worthen Co. v. Thomas 21 and Worthen v. Kavanaugh, 2 2 sustain
a judicial interdiction to thwart legislative efforts that annihilate property
rights in excess of the interest sought to be protected.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his opinion from the case under investigation,
subscribes to an ostensibly untenable position when he states, "Under the
bankruptcy power Congress may discharge the debtor's personal obligation,
because, unlike the States, it is not prohibited from impairing the obligation
of contract." Contract rights are a species of the genus, property, and, as
such, are as deserving of the protection of the due process clause as the more
tangible mediums of property. If the federal government can impair the
obligation of contract with impunity, the decisions of the court in the gold
clause, cases involving governmental contracts are beyond reconciliation. 23
Therein it was held that the federal government can not impair its own con-
tracts, recovery being denied only because the complainants failed to prove
substantial damages. The deduction is that discharge of personal obligations
under the approved sections of the bankruptcy law is due process of law in
that sufficient social interests sustain the principle; not that contract rights
are not protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The cases
are multiple in which state legislation has been declared unconstitutional under
the contract clause because available remedies as of the date when a mortgage
was given were later denied a mortgagee.2 4 Why, then, should these remedial
rights be construed as property rights in contradistinction to contract rights
in the present case?
Having determined that the principle of discharge as applied to personal
obligations must conform to the same formula of due process that rendered
this legislation, permitting of the discharge of ihe secured res, unconstitu-
tional, it is instructive to compare the resulting effects of both applications
of discharge to the creditor. The original Frazier-Lemke amendment proceeded
upon the theory that the secured creditor under ordinary foreclosure sale
would realize only the present appraised value of the land. Since the creditor
is likely to become the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and thus retain the
15 Manigault v. Springs (1905), 199 U. S. 473, Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park
(1878), 97 U. S. 659.
16 Atlantic Coast Line Ry Co. v. Goldsboro (1913), 232 U. S. 548.
1 7 Stone v. Miss. (1879), 101 U. S. 814.
18 Sproles v. Binford (1931), 286 U. 5. 374, Manigault v. Springs (1905),
199 U. S. 473, Ill. Central Ry. Co. v. Ill. (1892), 146 U. S. 387, Brown Hold-
ing Co. v. Feldman (1920), 256 U. S. 170; Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel (1921),
258 U. S. 242; Block v Hirsh (1920), 256 U S. 135.
19Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (1920), 256 U. S. 170; Levy Leasing Co.
v. Siegel (1921), 258 U. S. 242; Block v. Hirsh (1920), 256 U. S. 135.
20 Chicago and Alton Ry. Co. v. Tranbarger (1915), 238 U. S. 67
21 (1934), 292 U. S. 426.
22 (1935), 2V5 U. S. 56.
2 3 Perry v. U. S. (1935), 294 U. S. 330; Nortz v. U. S. (1935), 294 U. S. 317.
24 Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819), 4 Wheat. 122; W B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh (1935), 294 U. S. 555, Bronson v. Kinzie (1843), 1 How. 311,
Green v. Biddle (1823), 8 Wheat. 1, Howard v. Bugbee (1860), 24 How. 461,
Edwards v. Kearzey (1877), 96 U. S. 595,, McCracken v. Hayward (1844),
2 How. 608.
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res in the hope of an eventual restoration of its earning power, the basis
of the contention is obviously fallacious. There is, however, no fundamental
difference between the property right of the secured creditor here obliterated
and the position of the unsecured creditor who has suffered the annihilation
of a legal right through discharge of the debtor in bankruptcy. It is within
the province of bankruptcy to salvage the man who has hypothecated his
industry a life span in advance so that he will not become a peon of his
creditors. The Supreme Court has refused to permit bankruptcy to salvage
his home and his tools.
Although the objective of the original Frazier-Lemke amendment did not
vary from the aim of bankruptcy discharge, the surrounding provisions were
in ruthless disregard of the further bankruptcy aim of an equitable distribu-
tion of loss. Specifically, the present appraised value of Radford's property
amounted to $4,445. Under the deferred payment plan of paragraph 3 pro-
viding for a one per centum interest charge, the present value of this sum at
the legal rate of interest was approximately $3,405. In other words, Radford
would have been discharged by the payment of about 38 per centum of his
total indebtedness; a price of 76.6 per centum of the present appraised value
of the res. The one per centum interest on the appraised value, the only
payment to be made under paragraph 3 during the first year, would not
satisfy expenditures for taxes and insurance. Furthermore, the protracted
period over which the deferred payment plan was to operate did not have
the support of precedent. Only nominal discretion was lodged in the courts.
Legislative noratoria have been sustained only in as far as the statute
carefully hedged about the security res with protective assurances to the
creditor. 5 A ministerial discretion in the application and administration of
the law to specific cases was deposited with the courts. Through the opera-
tion of the Minnesota mortgage moratoribm, it was possible that the mort-
gagee as well as the debtor might realize from the renascence of earning
power by the continued operation of the res. The institution of credit might
.thereby be preserved. A reasonable rental charge accompanied the arrange-
ment and the duration of the moratorium was not oppressive. Clearly the
original Section 75, sub-section s, does not conform in its incidents to the
approved pattern. The principle it sought to propound has suffered from
intemperate draftsmanship.
Following this declaration of unconstitutionality, Congress enacted a new
sub-section s which, in effect, is a federal moratorium. 2 6 Its incidents provide
for a latitude of judicial discretion, a stay of proceedings for three years, and
an applicatioti of rental charges, first, to the upkeep and taxes on the property,
the residue to result to the creditors. The terms of the former statute for a
payment into court of the appraised value of the property is retained subject
to this proviso, "That upon request in writing by any secured creditor, the
court shall order the property upon which such secured creditor has a lien
to be sold at public auction. The debtor shall have ninety days to redeem
any property sold at such sale, by paying the amount for which any such
property was sold, together with five per centum interest, into court, and he
may apply for his discharge." By judicial interpretation in the case, In re
25 Home Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdelt (1934), 290 U. S. 398.
26 49 Stat. 792; 11 U. S. C. A. 203. The current sub-section s was enacted
Aug. 28, 1935.
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Young,27 the proviso is construed to declare that a judicial sale cannot be
had "until the debtor might evidence an intention to pay into court the ap-
praised value of the land." A distribution of loss through the reduction of
indebtedness to a point commensurate with the earning capacity of the land
is rendered nugatory by this provision for judicial sale. At most it offers
a scant moment in which other forces may effect a restoration of earning
power that will rehabilitate both debtor and creditor. Whether the principle
of moratorium is within the conception of bankruptcy necessarily remains
conjectural. The evolutionary progress of bankruptcy toward the principle
of rehabilitation tempts a belief in the constitutionality of this aspect of the
amendment. It is submitted that the balance of social values support this
legislation. The preservation of the industry of man in union with the imple-
ments of industry alone can fulfill and preserve the credit structure.
J.F T.
JURY-INTENTIONAL EXCLUSION OF WOMEN.-Appellant was convicted of em-
bezzlement. At the trial, the male defendant challenged the array upon the
ground that the jury commissioners had purposely and intentionally excluded
the names of women from those selected for jury service Testimony of the
commissioners supported this charge. Held, error to overrule such chal-
lenge.1
Is a jury selected from a jury box from which the names of women have
been intentionally excluded by the jury commissioners a legally drawn jury,
and if not, what are the consequences of such actions? Substantially, this was
the question which was recently presented to the Indiana Supreme Court.
The situation which provoked it is typical. The Lagrange county court
house did not facilitate a convenient separation of male and female jurors,
should a mixed jury ever be drawn. As a result, the Lagrange Circuit judge
and his jury commissioners had reached a tacit understanding that the names
of women be omitted from the jury box from which the panel was drawn to
avoid complications.
Although there is some conflict,2 it is now generally settled that women
are competent ind qualified jurors.3 Consequently, when the defendant in
this proceeding in the Lagrange circuit was to be tried by a jury from which
women were excluded, be challenged the array on the above ground. The
challenge was overuled, but on appeal the court refused any variance from
what it considered the hard and fast lines of statutory instructions to jury
27 (1935), 12 Fed. Supp. 30. Although the statute makes provision for a
reasonable rental charge, there is to be no payment until the end of the first
year of the moratorium. The court declares this to be an unsecured promise
"that deprives the mortgagee of an otherwise positive right to income for that
period."
In the case, In re Slaughter (1935), 12 Fed. Supp. 206, the court apparently
interprets the statute to authorize a judicial sale at the insistence of the
creditor before the end of the "three years probationary period."
I Walter v. State (1935), 195 N. E. 268 (Ind.).
2 18 Georgetown L. J. 393, 394, 16 A. L. R. 1154.
3 Palmer v. State (1926), 197 Ind. 625, 150 N. E. 917, Moore v. State
(1926), 197 Ind. 640, 151 N. E. 689; Wilkinson v. State (1926), 197 Ind. 642,
151 N. E. 690; Jalbert v. State (1928), 200 Ind. 380, 165 N. E. 522; Common-
wealth v. Maxwell (1921), 271 Pa. 378, 114 At. 825, People v. Baltz (1920),
212 Mich. 530, 180 N. W 423, 4 A. L. R. 140.
